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TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: DECISIONS OF
THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
BY THOMAS M. HANEY*
In its many years of providing a review of decisions of the Seventh
Circuit, the Chicago-Kent Law Review has never included a section deal-
ing with decisions of the court in the area known as transnational or
international law. Each year, however, the Seventh Circuit is compelled
to take up a number of cases in this area, cases which in one way or
another involve the legal systems of more than one country. These deci-
sions merit some discussion.
At the outset, it should be noted that the terms "transnational law"
and "international law" are misleading. Virtually all of the decisions in
this area, in fact, involve issues of United States law. What distinguishes
them, however, is their international or transnational aspects or
ramifications.
During recent terms, the Seventh Circuit has decided a number of
cases with a multinational dimension, involving issues of the proof of
foreign law, subject matter jurisdiction over activities outside of the
United States, extradition, sovereign immunity, international commercial
arbitration and letters of credit.' This article will review those decisions
of the Seventh Circuit. Unlike other articles in this symposium issue,
this article will examine decisions from the last several terms of the
court, to take account of the absence of an analysis of these cases from
prior Seventh Circuit reviews.
I. JURISDICTIONAL MATTERS
During the past few terms, the Seventh Circuit has decided two
cases that raised the question of the court's jurisdiction. Tamari v. Bache
& Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L.,2 was an action in which both the plaintiffs and
the defendant were not citizens of the United States. The plaintiffs were
citizens and residents of Lebanon. The defendant, a wholly owned sub-
* Professor and Associate Dean, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; B.S. and
M.B.A., Loyola University of Chicago; J.D. and LL.M., The University of Chicago.
1. A number of these decisions are in the area of immigration law; those decisions are not
within the scope of this article and are consequently not included here.
2. 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 221 (1984).
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sidiary of Bache & Co., Inc., a Delaware corporation, was a Lebanese
corporation with its sole office in Beirut. The defendant received futures
orders from the plaintiffs in Lebanon and transmitted them by wire to its
parent corporation for execution on the Chicago Board of Trade and the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The parent corporation, a member of
both exchanges, then executed the contracts. All communications and
meetings between the plaintiffs and the defendant regarding commodity
futures contracts traded in the United States took place in Lebanon.
The plaintiffs filed suit in 1975 against both the parent corporation
and the defendant subsidiary, claiming damages resulting from alleged
fraud and the mismanagement of their commodity futures trading ac-
counts. The action against the parent corporation was dismissed because
of a pending arbitration proceeding before the Chicago Board of Trade;
this proceeding ultimately resulted in a decision for Bache Delaware,
which was subsequently defended in a court action to vacate the arbitra-
tion award. 3
In ruling on the motion of the subsidiary for judgment on the plead-
ings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, the district court had
held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.4 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed Judge Getzendanner's decision regarding the subject
matter jurisdiction of the court over the dispute.5
The plaintiffs' suit had been brought under the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 7 U.S.C. sections 6(b) and 6(c). Initially, the court had to
decide whether the antifraud provisions of the CEA were intended by
Congress to apply to foreign brokers or agents of commodity exchange
members whenever they facilitate futures trading on United States ex-
changes. After reviewing the act and its legislative history, the Seventh
Circuit found nothing to indicate that Congress did not intend the CEA
to apply to foreign agents. This determination freed the court to discuss
subject matter jurisdiction according to the principles that have been de-
veloped in this country regarding the extraterritorial application of
statutes.
Two tests have been developed by U.S. courts to determine whether
or not subject matter jurisdiction exists over a dispute: the so-called
"conduct" and "effects" tests. The court cited sections 17 and 18 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
3. Tamari v. Bache Halsey Stuart Inc., 619 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 873
(1980).
4. Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) SAL, 547 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aft'd, 730 F.2d
1103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 221 (1984).
5. 730 F.2d at 1109.
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UNITED STATES (1965) (hereinafter referred to as the "RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)") as its authority for these tests.
According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND):
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its ter-
ritory, whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects
of the conduct outside of the territory.... (Section 17)
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside
the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of
justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed
legal systems. (Section 18)6
The Seventh Circuit held that the acts complained of in Tamari met
both tests, explicitly adopting the analysis of the district court. The
court noted only that the transmission of commodity futures orders to
the U.S. would be an "essential step" in the consummation of any
scheme to defraud through futures trading on U.S. exchanges-thus ap-
parently satisfying the "conducts" test. The "effects" test was satisfied
because the transactions initiated abroad directly implicated the pricing
and hedging functions of domestic markets; "prices and trading volumes
in the domestic marketplace [would] be artificially influenced, and public
confidence in the markets could be undermined." '7
In the second of the jurisdictional cases, Pfeiffer v. Wn. Wrigley
Jr. ," the Seventh Circuit applied other provisions of the RESTATEMENTS
6. The American Law Institute is in the process of preparing a RESTATEMENT OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED), hereinafter referred to as the "RE-
STATEMENT (REVISED) ." (It should be noted that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) was actually the
first and that the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) will be the second; "Developments, Restatement II,"
77th Ann. Proc. Am. Soc. int. L. 74 (1983).) The provision in the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) analo-
gous to §§ 17 and 18 appears as § 402 in Tentative Draft No. 6 (1985), which provides as follows:
[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1)(a) conduct a substantial part of which takes place within its territory; ....
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory; ....
7. 730 F.2d at 1108.
8. 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985).
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(SECOND) and (REVISED). The plaintiff was a U.S. citizen employed by
the defendant company as its Director for the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. The plaintiff was based solely in Munich and, after four years,
was placed on the rolls of the defendant's wholly owned West German
subsidiary. Five years later, when he reached the age of 65, the plaintiff
was let go. He brought suit in the Northern District of Illinois contend-
ing that his dismissal violated the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA).9 The district court held that ADEA had no extraterrito-
rial reach and dismissed the complaint;10 the Seventh Circuit affirmed."
ADEA itself was silent as to Congress's intention regarding its terri-
torial reach.1 2 The Act, however, had incorporated provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),13 including an indirect reference to
section 213(f), which prohibits the extraterritorial application of FLSA.
The plaintiff, however, contended that the appropriate analogy for
ADEA was not FLSA but rather Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 14 which act has been held to apply extraterritorially.15
The district court, however, followed the few cases which had re-
jected the Title VII analogy and had held that ADEA did not apply to
U.S. citizens working for U.S. companies in foreign countries. 16 The
court found no intention on the part of Congress that ADEA should
apply in such circumstances. The Seventh Circuit agreed, but its reliance
on the prior cases was much less forceful; its analysis was based primarily
on Congressional intent. 17
The Seventh Circuit raised another consideration: the possibility
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34.
10. 573 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1983), af'd, 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985).
11. 755 F.2d at 554.
12. The Seventh Circuit noted that, after argument in this case, Congress passed the Older
Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1767 (1984) which extends cover-
age of the ADEA to U.S. citizens employed abroad by American corporations or their subsidiaries.
The court stated that the amendment statute was not clear as to whether it was changing or clarify-
ing ADEA; in any event, the court refused to apply it retroactively and drew no conclusion from its
enactment to alter the result. The court also noted that the plaintiff might not have benefitted from
the amendment in any event since it excepted situations where ADEA would violate the law of the
country where the U.S. citizen was employed; see the discussion accompanying footnote 18). 755
F.2d at 559-60.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-02.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
15. Bryant v. International Schools Serv., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982).
16. Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251 (D.N.J. 1983), af'd, 728 F.2d 607
(3d Cir. 1984); Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 567 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Col. 1983), affd, 750 F.2d
827 (10th Cir. 1984).
17. The Seventh Circuit cited one recent case not used by the district court, Thomas v. Brown
& Root, Inc., 745 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1984), but it noted a "sense of unease about the literal ap-
proach" to the incorporation of the explicit non-extraterritorial provision of FLSA into ADEA. 755
F.2d at 556.
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that, if the defendant were subject to ADEA, it might find itself in a
position of being compelled to follow two possibly inconsistent laws:
ADEA and a West German mandatory-retirement law. 8 The court
cited a number of reasons why courts should avoid "outright collisions
between domestic and foreign law-collisions both hard on the people
caught in the cross-fire and a potential source of friction between the
United States and foreign countries": 19 1) the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of federal statutes;20 2) the potential compli-
cations of such a precedent applied to other situations;21 3) and the con-
siderations proposed by the Second and Revised Restatements. 22
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) attempted to articulate the factors
and circumstances under which a state is "required by international law
to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement ju-
risdiction" in order to prevent a direct conflict.23 These factors include
the vital national interests of each state, the extent and nature of the
hardships that would be imposed by inconsistent enforcement actions,
the place where the required conduct would have to take place, the na-
tionality of the parties, and the potential efficacy of such enforcement.
The RESTATEMENT (REVISED) takes a slightly different approach, char-
acterized by the Seventh Circuit as "a slight movement away from reli-
ance on territoriality as the touchstone of jurisdiction. '24 The proposed
rule is one of reasonableness. Although a basis for jurisdiction may be
present, the assertion of such jurisdiction is improper when it is unrea-
sonable; what is unreasonable is determined by the evaluation of "all rel-
evant factors," of which eight are specified. 25
18. The court treated the existence of such a West German law as hypothetical. The plaintiff's
own lawyer had apparently admitted to its existence in oral argument (a "very damaging [admission]
to his cause," according to the court), and the court's "own perhaps halting efforts" to research the
West German law of retirement were inconclusive. 755 F.2d at 557.
19. Id.
20. Id., citing cases including the Tamari decision (for the proposition that the presumption is
not absolute).
21. The court betrayed nostalgia for "the old days" when conflicts of law rules mandated a
clear answer (e.g., the application of the substantive law of the jurisdiction where the last act neces-
sary to make the defendant's conduct tortious had occurred), as opposed to the "more complex"
modem conflicts rules. Id.
22. Id. at 558.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), § 40.
24. 755 F.2d at 558.
25. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 403 (Ten. Draft No. 6 1985), provides as follows:
§ 403. Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under Sec. 402 is present, a state may not
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to the activities, relations, status, or in-
terests of persons or things having connections with another state or states when the exer-
cise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable or unreasonable is judged by evalu-
ating all the relevant factors, including, where appropriate,
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II. EXTRADITION
The Seventh Circuit decided two major cases involving extradition.
Both cases came to the Seventh Circuit on appeal from the denial of a
writ of habeas corpus by the district court; in each case, the appellate
court upheld the denial.
The first case, David v. Attorney General of the United States, 26 in-
volved the unique claim that, because the petitioner had been kidnapped
from Brazil by agents of the United States and thus his presence in this
country was not voluntary, the United States' courts lacked jurisdiction
over him. According to his claim, he was arrested in 1972 by Brazilian
officials who acted as, or with, agents of the United States. He was alleg-
edly held captive in Brazil for a month, subjected to "barbarous" treat-
ment and then forcibly transported to New York where he was arrested
by federal agents on drug trafficking charges. He pled guilty to those
charges and was sentenced to twenty years incarceration.
While in jail, the government of France filed a request for his extra-
dition on charges of wilful homicide and attempted wilful homicide of
police officers. Prior to 1974, what little law there was on the subject in
the United States suggested that the physical presence of a person was
sufficient cause for personal jurisdiction to attach (assuming valid subject
matter jurisdiction), notwithstanding the manner in which that physical
presence was secured. This principle was recognized in the maxim mala
captus bene detentus.2 7
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state, or
(ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or
between that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to
which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation in question;
(e) the importance of the regulation in question to the international political, legal or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the inter-
national system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
(3) When more than one state has a reasonable basis for exercising jurisdiction over a person
or activity, but the prescriptions by two or more states are in conflict, each state is expected to
evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exercising of jurisdiction in light of all the
relevant factors, including those set out in Subsection (2); and to defer to the other state if that
state's interest is greater.
26. 699 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 113 (1983).
27. The maxim mala captus bene detentus ("bad capture, good detention") recognizes the asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant without inquiring into the means by which his/her
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In 1974, however, the Second Circuit rejected that standard in
United States v. Toscanino.28 In that case, the defendant claimed that he
had been abducted in Uruguay, tortured and involuntarily brought to the
United States to stand trial on drug trafficking charges. The defendant
was found guilty at trial, but the Second Circuit concluded that the gov-
ernment had violated his constitutional right to due process: "[W]e view
due process as now requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over
the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the result of the
government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the
accused's constitutional rights."' 29 The Seventh Circuit has characterized
this holding as "intended to act as a deterrent to illegal conduct on the
part of [United States] law enforcement officials, much like the well-
known exclusionary rule, see Mapp v. Ohio ... ,,30 Given the similarity
of facts between the Toscanino case and those alleged in the present case,
the defendant asserted the lack of the court's jurisdiction over him.
The Seventh Circuit first noted that the Toscanino principle has not
been accepted by the Seventh Circuit in a federal criminal proceeding.31
In any event, the Seventh Circuit ruled that it would be clearly inapplica-
ble in the present case since the only issue before the court was the pro-
priety of the extradition hearing, through a habeas corpus review. The
purpose of Toscanino, as noted, was to deprive the government of the
fruits of its own illegal conduct. As the Seventh Circuit stated, "[tjo
require the extradition magistrate to divest himself of jurisdiction would
not serve to deter illegal conduct on the part of United States' officials
since the fruit of that alleged conduct, i.e. the guilty plea and subsequent
sentence, would be unaffected."' 32 Even the Second Circuit itself, like
other circuits, has held that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in extra-
dition proceedings. 33 In fact, the entire history of Toscanino has been
one of distinguishing it and rejecting its concern for the rights of the
individual defendant.3 4
presence was secured. The "landmark" decisions in this regard are Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886), and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
28. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
29. 500 F.2d at 275.
30. 699 F.2d at 414.
31. Citing U.S. v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 271-72 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977).
32. 699 F.2d at 414.
33. Id. (citing Simmons v. Braun, 627 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1980)).
34. This treatment of Toscanino has led a prominent commentator to conclude that "[the posi-
tion of the U.S. thus remains linked to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine which has been followed rather
consistently, even though with some erosion." Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States
Law and Practice, pp. V, 4-6-8 (1983). Bassiouni devotes Chapter 5 of his two-volume work to
"Abduction and Unlawful Seizure as Alternatives to Extradition." He notes that the United States
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The court noted that the effect of the petitioner's argument would be
to penalize France for the allegedly illegal conduct of United States
agents. The petitioner, however, also suggested that France itself was
indirectly involved in his kidnapping in that it was aware of the plan and
intended to arrange a trade of prisoners with the United States upon his
arrival in this country. The Seventh Circuit dismissed this argument,
stating that the defendant's allegations did not implicate France in any
unconstitutional conduct within the United States. Any impropriety by
French officials outside the United States would be a matter solely for the
French courts or other authorities to consider.
The second case in this area decided by the Seventh Circuit, In re
Burt,35 involved an unusual set of facts. On March 21, 1965, a West
German cab driver was murdered on the outskirts of Schweinfurt, West
Germany. Shortly thereafter, Burt (who was at that time a member of
the U.S. Army serving in West Germany) and another serviceman left
West Germany without army authorization and travelled to Madison,
Wisconsin. There, both men were picked up for a local armed robbery
and murder in July 1965. Although the Army questioned them while in
custody (with both men confessing their involvement in the West Ger-
man murder), the Army took no further action pending the results of the
state criminal proceeding for the Wisconsin murder. Both men pled
guilty to various Wisconsin charges, Burt to charges of first degree mur-
der and armed robbery, and his codefendant to third degree murder.
Although the Army had Burt's confession in 1965 to the murder of
the West German cabdriver, it was only in 1966 that it charged him with
that murder. On June 13, 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Miranda v. Arizona.3 6 Based on that decision, Army pros-
"increasingly resorts to extraordinary rendition devices, including abduction, thus circumventing
traditional extradition processes." Id., p. V, 4-11. He states that "[i]nternational legal doctrine...
remains ... opposed [to abduction and the like] and to the application of the maxim mala captus
bene detentus." Id., p. V, 2-9. He concludes: "At this stage in the development of international law
it is no longer possible to rationalize violations of international law on grounds of expediency or to
allow such violations to be perpetuated without an adequate deterrent-remedy." Id., p. V, 1-3. In
spite of Bassiouni's analysis, the reporters for the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) adhere to the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine, modified only slightly: "A person apprehended in a foreign state, whether by for-
eign or by U.S. officials, and delivered to the United States, may be prosecuted in the United States
unless he was treated in such outrageous and reprehensible manner as to shock the conscience of
civilized society." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 433 (Tent. Draft No. 3 1982). The title of § 433 and
the arrangement of sections emphasize that this is U.S., not international, law; the Reporters' Note 2
to § 432 casts doubt on mala captus bene detentus as a principle of international law. A slanted but
intriguing article in the popular press on this legal topic, prompted by the Achille Laura situation, is
Burnham, The Law: Hiacking Justice, Chicago Reader, Nov. 8,1985, at p. 12. See also U.S. Is Said
to Weigh Abducting Terrorists Abroad for Trials Here, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
35. 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984).
36. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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ecutors concluded that Burt could not be successfully courtmartialed be-
cause his confession had not been obtained in a matter entirely consistent
with the requirements announced in the Miranda decision. The Army
subsequently gave Burt a dishonorable discharge based on his civilian
conviction in Wisconsin.
In the meantime, the Army had notified West Germany about
Burt's alleged involvement in the West German killing. Under the trea-
ties then in existence between the United States and West Germany regu-
lating crimes committed by American servicemen against West German
citizens, the technical primary right of West Germany to exercise juris-
diction over the matter, pursuant to the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment, 37 was automatically waived (by virtue of a supplementary
agreement between the United States and West Germany38). West Ger-
many, however, could recall such waiver in a case in which the exercise
of jurisdiction was considered imperative by the West German govern-
ment; such waiver could be exercised by giving notice to U.S. officials.
As a result, when the Army notified West Germany in December
1965 about the alleged involvement of Burt in the West German killing,
the Army automatically became vested with the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over him. After the Army decided not to prosecute Burt,
however, that decision was conveyed to West German officials, who
sought to recall West Germany's waiver of jurisdiction. The U.S. De-
partments of State and Defense, however, jointly made a decision not to
return Burt to West Germany because they did not want to set a prece-
dent of allowing West Germany to recall a waiver at such a late date and
after the Army had exercised its prosecutorial discretion. The family of
the West German cabdriver was compensated by the United States
government.
Once Burt had been dishonorably discharged from the Army, he
could not be returned to West Germany because he was no longer subject
to American military authority. In addition, since he was a U.S. citizen,
Burt could not then be extradited to West Germany as a civilian because
the treaty, pursuant to customary U.S. practice, did not allow the extra-
dition of a country's own citizens.
In 1978, however, the United States and West Germany entered into
37. Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their
Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (effective Aug. 23, 1953) (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "NATO-SOFA Treaty").
38. Status of Forces Agreement with Respect to Forces Stationed in the Federal Republic of
Germany, Aug. 3, 1959, 14 U.S.T. 531, T.I.A.S. No. 5351 (effective July 1, 1963).
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a new extradition treaty which became effective on August 29, 1980.39
This treaty contained no obligation on the part of either country to refuse
extradition of its own citizens. In addition, it explicitly provided the ob-
ligation to extradite persons found within one country who had commit-
ted crimes in the other, including crimes committed before, as well as
after, the date the treaty became effective. On September 1, 1980, West
Germany issued a warrant for the arrest of Burt and formally requested
his extradition on February 12, 1981. The U.S. Department of State ac-
cepted that request on March 23, 1981, and on May 11, 1981, the U.S.
Attorney for the Eastern District of Wisconsin filed a complaint before a
magistrate for that district seeking Burt's arrest and certification of ex-
traditability. The magistrate subsequently certified Burt to the Secretary
of State for extradition and ordered his arrest.
Burt filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the
magistrate's order, alleging a number of violations of his due process
rights. The district court rejected the petitioner's arguments.
Initially, the Seventh Circuit had to decide the scope of habeas
corpus review of an extradition order. The court rejected the narrow
scope of review prescribed in Fernandez v. Phillips,4° and held that fed-
eral courts "have the authority to consider not only procedural defects in
the extradition procedures that are of constitutional dimension, but also
the substantive conduct of the United States in undertaking its decision
to extradite if such conduct violates constitutional rights. '41 The court
cited with approval the recent decision in Plaster v. United States,42
which stated:
It is well-settled, however, that the United States government must, in
carrying out its treaty obligations, conform its conduct to the require-
ments of the Constitution, and that treaty obligations cannot justify
otherwise unconstitutional governmental conduct.... [A]lithough the
Secretary of State and the President have the discretion not to extradite
an individual for any reason whatsoever .... they may not choose to
extradite an individual where such extradition would, in the opinion of
the judiciary, violate the individual's constitutional rights.43
Having resolved the scope of habeas corpus review, the Seventh Cir-
cuit examined both the 1966 decision not to extradite Burt under the
NATO-SOFA Treaty and the decision to extradite under the 1978
Treaty. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's rejection of all of
39. Treaty between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Extra.
dition, June 20, 1978, 32 U.S.T. 1485, T.I.A.S. No. 9785 (effective Aug. 29, 1980).
40. 268 U.S. 311 (1925).
41. 737 F.2d at 1484.
42. 720 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1983).
43. Id. at 348-49.
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Burt's arguments, primarily because the court adhered to a basic distinc-
tion between prosecution and extradition. Were the government to at-
tempt to prosecute Burt, the long delay would have implicated
constitutional rights. Not so, however, where the government merely ex-
tradites (the district court having analogized the government's role to
that of a process server for West Germany44). The Seventh Circuit
proclaimed:
We hold that no standards of fair play and decency sufficient to trigger
due process concerns are automatically implicated when, in undertak-
ing its foreign policy mission, a governmental extradition decision sub-
jects a citizen accused of committing crimes in a foreign jurisdiction to
prosecution in the foreign state after a substantial time has elapsed
since the commission of the crime.45
The foreign state, not the United States, is the instigator of the ex-
tradition; the court must be respectful of the government's foreign policy
decisionmaking; the 1978 Treaty itself explicitly states that it is to be
applied retroactively; and even if Burt were entitled to the "prompt and
speedy trial" guaranteed by the NATO-SOFA Treaty, his right would be
enforceable only in the West German courts. The court did admit, how-
ever, that this situation may result in a "hardship" to Burt.46
III. HUMAN RIGHTS
The Seventh Circuit has decided two cases in recent terms in which
a wife has sued because of the detention of her husband in a foreign
country. Both presented fairly novel uses of accepted doctrine. In the
first case the defendant was the U.S. Secretary of State, and in the second
it was the Soviet Union. I have called these "human rights" cases, even
though they both concern primarily the interpretation of federal statutes.
The former, Flynn v. Shultz, 47 involved the much publicized case of
an American businessman, Richard Flynn, convicted and jailed in Mex-
ico on charges of criminal fraud. 48 The suit by the wife sought an order
of mandamus or injunction to compel the Secretary of State, George
Shultz, to authorize the testimony of a State Department consular official
and to take other actions under the Hostage Act.49 The district court
44. 737 F.2d at 1482.
45. Id. at 1487.
46. Id. at 1486.
47. 748 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 94 (1985).
48. The facts of the case were widely publicized, particularly in the Chicago area, and were the
subject of many commentaries. See, e.g., Weisberg, The Untold Story of Richard Flynn, Chicago
Lawyer, vol. 7, no. 9 (Sept. 1984), at 1, col. I.
49. 22 U.S.C. § 1732.
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granted summary judgment for the defendant, and the appellate court
affirmed that judgment.
A consular official at the U.S. embassy in Mexico, Philip Battaglia,
attended certain meetings between Flynn and Mexican corporate and
government officials, held to resolve a contract dispute between Flynn's
American business firm and a recently-nationalized Mexican corpora-
tion. While the facts of the matter are not completely clear, Flynn was
ultimately charged with criminal fraud in connection with his participa-
tion in the corporate contract dispute. He was tried, convicted and sen-
tenced to six years in prison and the payment of over one million U.S.
dollars in reparations. That decision was appealed to the Mexican
Supreme Court.
Mrs. Flynn sought, by her action in Chicago, to compel Battaglia to
testify before the Mexican Supreme Court about his participation in the
contract negotiations. The State Department had refused to authorize
his testimony, citing its standard practices and procedures. Only if the
Mexican government had requested such testimony would the State De-
partment have considered allowing Battaglia to so testify.
While limited consular immunity has long been an accepted interna-
tional standard, the rules governing the role of consuls were not clarified
until the adoption of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in
1963. The United States eventually became a party to that convention in
1969.50 Article 44(3) of that convention provides that "[m]embers of
consular post are under no obligation to give evidence concerning mat-
ters connected with the exercise of their functions. . . ." The United
States/Mexican consular convention 51 provides a similar immunity. Ar-
ticle 45 of the Vienna Convention also provides, however, an exception
whereby the state sending the consular agent (and only that state) may
waive the immunity by express written waiver. According to the State
Department's practice, this waiver would be granted only upon a formal
written request from the host government.
In spite of the absence of a request for Battaglia's testimony from
the Mexican government, Mrs. Flynn contended that the State Depart-
ment was obliged to authorize the testimony by the specific Congres-
sional mandate found in the Hostage Act and by the sixth amendment.
The Hostage Act provides as follows:
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of
the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under
50. 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (effective Dec. 24, 1969).
51. 57 Stat. 800, T.S. No. 985, 9 Bevans 1076 (effective July 1, 1943).
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the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the
President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of such
imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the
rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand
the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasona-
bly delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not
amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to
obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings rela-
tive thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the Presi-
dent to Congress.52
The Seventh Circuit engaged in a long, detailed discussion of the
political question doctrine, to ascertain if the plaintiff's claim was justici-
able. The court acknowledged that scrutiny of executive or legislative
action in areas touching on the sensitive area of foreign relations is not
automatically barred, but stated that the "standard of review applied in
those cases is nonetheless a very deferential one."'53 Based on several
similar cases, 54 the court held that the case "is characterized by a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolution" '55 and
thus it fell within the "judicially unmanageable" category of the political
question doctrine because "resolution of the issues ... would ... require
ascertainment of facts and standards of decision that are beyond judicial
discovery and management" and "would interfere with the Executive's
constitutionally committed discretion to conduct foreign relations. ' 56
The court found that most of the forms of relief sought by Mrs.
Flynn (that the State Department be compelled to demand reasons for
Flynn's imprisonment from the Mexican government, demand his re-
lease, etc.) were not contemplated by the Hostage Act in this kind of
situation. It found that it had no standard whereby to judge whether
Flynn had been "unjustly deprived" of his liberty by the foreign govern-
ment, a preliminary determination to be made by the President before the
Hostage Act mandated action. The court found insufficient facts were
alleged even assuming arguendo that there was an objective standard by
which to measure them.
It was only one form of relief sought by the plaintiff (that the de-
fendant inquire into the question of whether Flynn's deprivation of lib-
erty was unjust) that the court agreed was proper. Since, according to
52. 22 U.S.C. § 1732.
53. 748 F.2d at 1191.
54. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aftd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Dumas v. President of the United States, 554 F. Supp. 10 (D.
Conn. 1982); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936
(1974).
55. 748 F.2d at 1192.
56. Id. at 1193.
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the court, such an order (being internal) would not interfere with the
President's conduct of foreign relations and since such review by the
court would not involve the court in applying standards that were be-
yond judicial management or discovery, the Seventh Circuit held that
"the political question doctrine does not bar our consideration of plain-
tiffs' claims that the Hostage Act requires defendant to inquire whether
Flynn's deprivation of liberty was unjust. ... -57 The court, however,
found that the State Department had satisfied its obligation.
The court reviewed the legislative history of the Hostage Act, passed
by Congress in reaction to the detention of U.S. citizens in Iran, to deter-
mine if it had any application at all to the present case. The decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Dames and Moore v. Regan58 appeared to
limit the application of the Hostage Act to situations where U.S. citizens
are held because of a lack of recognition of their U.S. citizenship. The
legislative history convinced the Seventh Circuit to adopt a broader read-
ing of the statute, making it applicable to all U.S. citizens imprisoned by
foreign governments.5 9 Following Redpath v. Kissinger,60 the court held
that "when the President is informed that a United States citizen is im-
prisoned abroad, the Hostage Act requires the Executive to undertake a
meaningful inquiry into the circumstances of the detention in order to
determine whether the citizen is unjustly deprived of liberty."' 6' Con-
trary to plaintiff's allegation, however, the court concluded that the gov-
ernment's actions in the case had fully satisfied its obligations under the
statute.
The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claims under the fifth and
sixth amendments, which had sought to find a deprivation of Flynn's
constitutional rights by the U.S. government in a situation in which the
court found the wrongs (if any) to have been perpetrated by the Mexican
government or simply to be nonjusticiable under the political question
doctrine.
The second of the so-called "human rights" cases was Frolova v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.62 The plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, met
and married a Russian in Moscow while she was pursuing her graduate
studies in the Soviet Union. A month later she returned to this country.
Her husband's requests for permission to leave the U.S.S.R. were denied.
57. Id. at 1195.
58. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
59. See Note, United States Citizen in Foreign Prison Cannot Compel the Testimony of a Consu-
lar Official, 17 VANDERBILT J. OF TRANSNATL. L. 1032 (1984).
60. 415 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1976).
61. 748 F.2d at 1196.
62. 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985).
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After almost a year of separation, the husband (with other Soviet citizens
in similar situations) began a hunger strike in Moscow. The plaintiff filed
an action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
seeking an injunction and damages from the Soviet Union. Soon thereaf-
ter, the husband was granted an exit visa and joined his wife in the
United States. The plaintiff discontinued her request for injunctive relief
but maintained her action for damages.
Judge Rozkowsi of the district court, acting sua sponte, dismissed
the action on the ground that the denial of the exit visa was an act of
state and that the court was consequently precluded from passing judg-
ment on it.63 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, in a per curiam decision, but
on a different ground. Without ever reaching the act of state issue, the
court held that the U.S.S.R. was entitled to sovereign immunity.64
The plaintiff alleged that the Soviet Union's adherence to the United
Nations Charter and to the Helsinki Accords of 197565 either precluded
its claim of sovereign immunity or constituted a waiver thereof. With
regard to the former, the court applied the traditional rule that treaties,
regardless of their international effect and regardless that they are "the
law of the land" under the Constitution, must be self-executing in order
to provide the basis for litigation in this country. Whether a treaty is
self-executing or not is an issue for judicial interpretation. 66 The court
had no difficulty in determining that the UN Charter was not self-execut-
ing; this has been the virtually unanimous decision of courts faced with
the question.67
Similarly, the court held that the Helsinki Accords were not self-
executing-although this issue appears not to have reached the federal
courts before. The court's decision was based on the language of the
Accords themselves and on President Ford's statement before signing
them.
With regard to the plaintiff's argument that the Soviet Union's ad-
herence to these two treaties constituted a waiver of its sovereign immu-
nity, the court was forced to examine the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) of 1976.68 The statute does allow for the possibility of a
63. 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985).
64. Id.
65. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, August 1, 1975, 73 Dep't
St. Bull. 323 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), § 154 (1).
67. See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952); see also the cases cited by
the court, 761 F.2d at 374 n.n. 5 & 6.
68. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1976).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
country's waiving its sovereign immunity, 69 but such waiver (it has been
held) must be express or convincing evidence must be adduced to show
that a state intended to waive its immunity implicitly by its actions. The
court found no evidence whatsoever that the U.S.S.R., in signing either
the UN Charter or the Helsinki Accords, intended to waive its
immunity.
The court also did not find a waiver in the failure of the Soviet
Union to defend the plaintiff's action against it. (The Soviet Union's
defense was provided by the U.S. Attorney's office. In fact, in a footnote,
the court raises the intriguing possibility that the U.S.S.R. was never
served properly in the first place; this issue was apparently never argued
and the court refused to consider the case solely on this issue lest the
plaintiff merely re-serve the defendant properly.) There is no precedent
that a simple failure to defend constitutes a waiver of sovereign
immunity.
Finally, the plaintiff pointed to another provision of FSIA
§ 1605(a)(5), which provides that sovereign immunity is waived in cases:
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for per-
sonal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States and caused by the tortious act or ommission [sic] of
that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state
while acting within the scope of his office or employment....
The plaintiff alleged her loss of consortium as her injury in this country.
The court examined the legislative history of the FSIA and its subse-
quent interpretation by the courts and found no basis for the plaintiff's
assertion. 70 The court particularly noted that other portions of the stat-
ute were adopted in accordance with the jurisdictional principles of sec-
tion 18 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), the "effects" standards, 71 but
that any "reference to Section 18 is conspicuously absent from the sec-
tions of the committee reports discussing" the portion of the statute
quoted above.72 The court thus adopted a cautious interpretation of this
provision of FSIA, one probably intended by Congress.73
69. Id. at § 1605(a)(1).
70. The plaintiff argued that FSIA gave the U.S. courts jurisdiction if the injury occurred in
this country, regardless of where the tortious act causing the injury took place (in or out of the U.S.).
Although the Seventh Circuit appeared to concede this interpretation of sec. 1605(a)(5) "at first
blush," it rejected it because all other courts that had considered it (except one) had rejected it. The
one exception was Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980); the court also cited
a similar interpretation in a concurring and dissenting opinion in Persinger v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 844 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 247 (1984). 761 F.2d at 379 n.3.
71. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
72. 761 F.2d at 380.
73. See Note, "Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-tortious act exception-implied waiver of im-
TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
As noted, the RESTATEMENT is in the process of being revised. The
plaintiff cited Tentative Draft No. 2 of the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) to
buttress her position, since that revision of section 18 would have granted
jurisdiction if the tortious act or omission causing injury in this country
occurred elsewhere. (The Seventh Circuit noted that this is "an interpre-
tation which. . . has been almost uniformly rejected by the courts."' 74)
'But, the court pointed out, the very next sentence of the Tentative Draft
cut against her argument: "Indirect effects in the United States, such as
loss of consortium resulting from injury to a claimant's spouse by the
foreign state outside the United States, are not within the jurisdiction of
courts in the United States under this section."'75
IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The issue of the sovereign immunity of a foreign government was
raised in Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, discussed above. 76
The issues of sovereign immunity, as well as that of service of process on
a foreign government (alluded to in Frolova), were also raised in Alberti v.
Empresa Nicaraguense de la Came.77
The plaintiffs in Alberti, an individual and a corporation of unidenti-
fied nationality (although it was apparently incorporated somewhere in
the United States), owned 35% of the stock of a Nicaraguan corporation
which was later nationalized by the Nicaraguan government. The gov-
ernment then operated the business through its agent, Empresa Ni-
caraguense de la Came (ENCAR). The plaintiffs received no
compensation for their interest in the nationalized company (which they
valued at over one million dollars), nor did they seek any relief through
Nicaraguan channels.
After the nationalization, the plaintiffs ordered products (frozen
beef) from ENCAR but refused to pay for them after their delivery in
Florida. Instead, the plaintiffs filed suit in an Illinois state court against
ENCAR and the Republic of Nicaragua seeking a declaratory judgment
that they could offset the value of their stock in the nationalized com-
pany against the amount they owed for the beef they purchased. They
also sought recovery for the wrongful conversion of their Nicaraguan
stock. ENCAR filed suit in a Florida state court for the unpaid debt
munity-no private right of action under UN Charter and Helsinki Accords," 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1057
(1985).
74. 761 F.2d at 380 n.14.
75. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) § 454 comment e (Tent. Draft No. 2 1985).
76. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
77. 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
(which case was stayed pending the outcome of the litigation in Illinois).
It also removed the plaintiffs' Illinois suit to the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. ENCAR then moved in federal court to
dismiss the suit because of improper service of process, lack of personal
jurisdiction and the act of state doctrine. The plaintiffs did not respond
,to the motion and Judge Parsons, without a written opinion, granted the
motion on all grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, primarily on
grounds of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
The appellate court found that personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ants was lacking, because of the plaintiffs' improper service of process.
78
Rather than allowing the plaintiffs the opportunity to effect service prop-
erly, the Seventh Circuit addressed the question as to whether, regardless
of service, there would be proper subject matter jurisdiction. The resolu-
tion of this issue depended on whether there was any exception to the
immunity granted to the defendants under the FSIA. The court summa-
rily dismissed two of the plaintiffs' arguments, noting that the plaintiffs
had deliberately and artificially manufactured a "commercial" contro-
versy and had maneuvered the defendants into court.
More significant, however, was the plaintiffs' claim based on section
1605(a)(3) of FSIA, which provides as follows:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case...
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law
are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such is
present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or
any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agent or instru-
mentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States....
The issue raised by the plaintiffs was whether Nicaragua's nationali-
zation was a violation of international law, in light of its failure to pay
compensation to the plaintiffs. The parties to the dispute disagreed as to
the standards to be applied to compensation for nationalizations. The
plaintiffs (according to the court) demanded prior payment, while the
defendants contended that they need only establish reasonable provisions
for the determination and payment of just compensation. (There ap-
peared to be few facts about exactly what had transpired between the
parties in this regard.)
Although the Seventh Circuit opted for the traditional U.S. stan-
78. Section 1608(a)(3) of FSIA sets forth a procedure requiring service to be sent "to the head
of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned." The plaintiffs had served only the
Ambassador of Nicaragua in Washington. 705 F.2d at 252.
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dard of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation 79 (thus rejecting
the prior compensation standard urged by the plaintiffs), the court based
its decision on the plaintiffs' failure to meet their burden of proof. The
defendants satisfied their initial burden of showing that they fit within the
definition of a foreign state under the FSIA and that the suit relates to a
public, governmental act (nationalization). They were thus prima facie
entitled to immunity, unless the plaintiffs could demonstrate that a statu-
tory exemption was applicable. This they failed to do.
V. ARBITRATION
The Seventh Circuit has decided one case, Sauer-Getriebe KG v.
White Hydraulics, Inc. 80 involving international commercial arbitration
which deserves mention, since this is a common form of dispute settle-
ment in international business transactions.
The defendant White, an Indiana corporation, entered into an agree-
ment with Sauer, a West German limited partnership, 81 whereby White
gave Sauer an exclusive right to sell its motors in a number of other
countries, plus associated trade secrets and other rights, in exchange for a
royalty. The contract contained an arbitration clause, both parties agree-
ing that "[a]ny and all disputes arising out of and in connection with" the
agreement would be settled by arbitration under the rules of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The arbitration was to take place
in London.
After White attempted to repudiate the contract by selling its assets
(including the rights granted to Sauer) to a third party, Sauer filed a
diversity action in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana
in order to enjoin White from selling any such rights pending resolution
of Sauer's claim through arbitration. White responded that the filing of
the suit waived Sauer's right to arbitrate; White also sought a declaration
that the contract was unenforceable for vagueness and want of considera-
79. 705 F.2d at 255. Section 187 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) concurs in this formulation
of the standard. The "black letter" of the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) initially appeared to avoid the
issue, although Comment e to § 712 (Tent. Draft No. 3) confirmed the traditional U.S. formulation
of the standard. Tent. Draft No. 6 (1985) appends a standard in § 712(1): "for compensation to be
just.... it must... be in an amount equivalent to the value of the property taken and must be paid
at the time of taking, or within a reasonable time thereafter with interest from that date, and in a
form economically usable by the foreign national; .... See Editorial Comment, Compensation for
Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1984); Note, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 176 (1984); Agora: What Price Expropriation?, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 414, 420 (1985).
80. 715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 976 (1984).
81. The court translated "KG" as a limited partnership, the usual translation of Kom-
manditgesellschaft. Sauer, 715 F.2d at 349. See II MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 71 (Cohn ed. 1971).
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tion, that the terms were unconscionable and inequitable, and that it vio-
lated the Sherman Act.
After a bench trial, the district court denied Sauer's requested in-
junction, and it enjoined Sauer from proceeding with the arbitration.
(Sauer had filed its request for arbitration with the ICC in Paris, not
London; the court gave Sauer leave to refile in London but stated that its
findings would be binding in any subsequent arbitration proceedings.)
The Seventh Circuit reversed and directed the district court to enter the
injunction requested by Sauer. Portions of the opinion not bearing on
the international commercial arbitration aspect of the case will not be
discussed here.
The appellate court rejected White's contention that, before an arbi-
tration clause can be enforced, a court must pass on the validity of the
contract which contains that clause. The court noted that the validity of
the contract was itself an issue ("any and all disputes") that could be
settled by the arbitration.
The more important issue was whether Sauer's filing suit constituted
a waiver of the right to arbitrate. (The lower court had not found such a
waiver, although it did enjoin arbitration because of the filing in Paris.)
White asserted two prior Seventh Circuit decisions to buttress its allega-
tion of waiver,8 2 but the court rightly noted that these cases were clearly
distinguishable. Sauer's suit was in no way inconsistent with its interest
in arbitrating (unlike the prior cases), and Sauer had consistently as-
serted its intention to utilize and abide by the arbitration clause in the
contract. The relief sought by Sauer was simply the preservation of the
status quo pending such arbitration.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit noted that Sauer's filing in Paris was
not a violation of the provision for arbitration in London, since the place
of filing is not necessarily the place where the arbitration would be held.
Sauer, in fact, had chosen an arbitrator who resided in London. The
appellate court overturned the lower court's order directing Sauer to se-
lect a new arbitrator.
The Seventh Circuit made a statement of policy about arbitration
although, strangely enough, it did not relate it to the international con-
text: "[T]he public interest is served by granting this injunctive relief
because there is a strong policy in favor of carrying out commercial arbi-
tration when a contract contains an arbitration clause. Arbitration light-
ens courts' workloads, and it usually results in a speedier resolution of
82. Galion Iron Works v. J.D. Adams Mfg. Co., 128 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1942) and United
States v. Bregman Constr. Corp., 256 F.2d 851 (7th Cir. 1958).
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controversies." 83 Although the issues were different, compare the tone of
the statement of Justice Stewart in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.: "A pa-
rochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international
arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would
invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to se-
cure tactical litigation advantages."8 4
VI. LETTERS OF CREDIT
A recent decision of the Seventh Circuit involves the use of a letter
of credit (a traditional means of financing sales, particularly in transna-
tional situations) as a guarantee of performance, a "standby" letter of
credit. This use of letters of credit has become quite common in recent
years and received notoriety in the legal community as a result of the
revolution in Iran and the subsequent rupture of political and commer-
cial relations with the United States.85
In Banque Paribas v. Hamilton Industries International, Inc.,86 a
U.S. corporation, Hamilton, had bid for a subcontract with Saudi
Medcenter (SMC), a Saudi Arabian corporation that had bid on a con-
tract to do construction work in Saudi Arabia. Since SMC required that
Hamilton guarantee its bid, Hamilton obtained a standby letter of credit
from American National Bank in Chicago. The letter of credit named
the Bahrain branch of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (Paribas) as
the advising bank, although the court suggested that Paribas was more
likely a confirming bank;87 the choice of classification would not affect
the outcome, however.
American National, under the letter of credit, would pay Paribas the
amount of the letter of credit if Paribas certified that it had paid SMC
under Paribas's own guarantee of Hamilton's bid. Paribas followed the
form of guarantee supplied with American National's letter of credit and
undertook to pay SMC "forthwith following demand made.., in writing
(which writing shall refer to the number and date of this letter of guaran-
83. 761 F.2d at 352.
84. 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974).
85. See. e.g., Zimmett, Standby Letters of Credit in the Iran Litigation: Two Hundred Problems
in Search of a Solution, 16 LAW & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 927 (1984); Symposium: The Law of Letters
of Credit and Standbys in the 1980's, 24 Ariz. L. Rev. 235 (1982).
86. 767 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1985).
87. An advising bank is one which simply gives notification of the issuance of a letter of credit
by another bank. A confirming bank, however, is one which promises either that it will itself honor
a letter of credit issued by another bank or that such a letter of credit will be honored by the issuer or
a third bank. See U.C.C. § 5-103(e), (f).
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tee). . . ." The guarantee was to be construed in accordance with Saudi
Arabian law.
Before the expiration of the letter of credit, Paribas demanded pay-
ment from American National under the letter of credit, since it had to
pay SMC pursuant to the guarantee. SMC's demands had taken the
forms of a telephone call and a subsequent (and somewhat ambiguous)
telex. The latter, however, did not contain the number and date of the
guarantee, as required by the terms of the guarantee. American National
refused to honor Paribas's request. Instead, it filed suit in the Northern
District of Illinois, interpleaded Hamilton, SMC, and Paribas, and asked
the court who was entitled to payment.88 The district court granted
Hamilton's motion for summary judgment on the ground that, since the
guarantee was part of the letter of credit, American National was not
bound to pay since Paribas had failed to comply with the terms of the
guarantee.
In an opinion by Judge Posner, reminiscent in style of a treatise on
the law of letters of credit, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded
the matter for further consideration. The majority of the court believed
that the matter was simply inappropriate for resolution on summary
judgment, there being factual questions unresolved without a trial. Se-
nior District Judge Edward Dumbauld of the Western District of Penn-
sylvania, sitting by designation, agreed with the reversal and apparently
would have been willing to grant judgment to Paribas, although he stated
that "if my interpretation is sound, it will rest on all the stronger ground
if the facts are fully developed at trial."'8 9
The court noted that the requirement in the guarantee that a de-
mand specify the number and date of the guarantee might conceivably
("although improbably") not be a condition precedent but merely pres-
ent in the guarantee for Paribas's own protection and therefore waivable
by it. The court discussed the "long tradition" of requiring strict compli-
ance with the terms of letters of credit and the need to continue that
tradition.90 A second unresolved question, however, was that the guar-
antee was said to be governed by Saudi Arabian law, which was not in
88. Since Hamilton had agreed to hold American National harmless in the event the U.S. bank
had to pay Paribas, the real dispute over the letter of credit funds was between Hamilton and
Paribas. 767 F.2d at 383.
89. 767 F.2d at 386 (Dumbauld, J., concurring).
90. Judge Posner refers to this as "a tradition which, though challenged [citations omitted], as
so many of the strict requirements of the law are challenged nowadays, has managed to retain its
vitality." Id. at 384. This nostalgia is reminiscent of his reference to the "old days" in Pfeiffer v.
Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., supra note 21.
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evidence 9 and which needed to be taken into account. (It was suggested,
for example, that Saudi Arabian law requires only substantial compliance
with the terms of guarantees in letters of credit.) Likewise, there was no
allegation of, and certainly no proof of, Paribas's collusion with SMC 92
to defraud Hamilton. Finally, there was also the unresolved question as
to whether the guarantee was intended to be incorporated in the letter of
credit, so that the requirements for one would be part of the require-
ments for the other.
91. The court hinted at the difficulties of discovering foreign law, referring to "what little we
have been able to learn about the commercial law of Saudi Arabia on our own," citing one law
review article. 767 F.2d at 384. A similar difficulty in discovering foreign law was referred to
Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., supra note 18.
92. To use Judge Posner's phrase, Paribas "[being] in cahoots with SMC." 767 F.2d at 385; see
also id. at 384.

